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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
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Abstract 
The 2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) requires the DoD’s Office of 
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to “periodically assess and update the 
cost (or inflation) indexes used by the Department to ensure that such indexes have a sound 
basis and meet the Department’s needs for realistic cost estimation.” The objective of this 
paper is to provide CAPE with a factual and analytical basis for responding to this provision of 
WSARA. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the rationale for using inflation indexes in general, in the 
government as a whole, and in the DoD. It then identifies the regulatory and statutory 
provisions that support the issuance of inflation guidance by the Under Secretary of Defense 
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(Comptroller; USD[C]). Next, it describes how this guidance is applied by describing the key 
features of the processes used in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the 
Services to adjust for inflation in estimating the costs of and budgeting for major systems. It 
evaluates the appropriateness of using the inflation indices provided by the USD(C). Finally, it 
compares the Comptroller’s rates with some alternatives and considers whether modifications 
to current practices might better meet the DoD’s needs for realistic cost estimation. 
Introduction 
The 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) requires the DoD, 
Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to “periodically assess and 
update the cost (or inflation) indexes used by the Department to ensure that such indexes 
have a sound basis and meet the Department’s needs for realistic cost estimation.” The 
objective of this paper is to provide CAPE with a factual and analytical basis for responding 
to this provision of WSARA. Because WSARA is concerned with the cost of major systems, 
much of our attention is given to the treatment of inflation by Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). 
In the next section, we present a discussion of the general rationale for inflation and 
price indexes, whether applied to the economy as a whole, to the government, or to the 
DoD. In the section The Derivation of Inflation Indexes for Use by the DoD, we describe how 
DoD price indexes are developed. We address (a) the regulatory and statutory provisions 
that govern the issuance of inflation guidance by the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Comptroller (USD[C]), and (b) how these provisions are applied by describing the key 
features of the processes used in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and in the 
Services to produce inflation guidance. 
In the next two sections, we turn to how the DoD uses the deflators and other 
considerations in budgeting and in cost analyses related to procurement. We then discuss 
the current practices by the DoD in general and by the Services. In the section Analysis of 
Alternative Deflators for MDAPs, we compare the USD(C)’s price index for procurement with 
alternatives, principally the national defense indexes published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), and defense-related relevant producer price indexes published by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The purpose of these comparisons is to explore the 
possibility that modifications to current practices might better meet the DoD’s needs for 
realistic cost estimation. 
We next assess current DoD practices for accounting for inflation; and in the final 
section, we present concluding observations and recommendations. 
We are careful, in discussing price indexes, to differentiate between those that cover 
the entire economy and those that cover specific classes of goods and services. The former 
we generally refer to as inflation indexes and the latter as price indexes or escalation 
indexes. 
The General Rationale for Inflation Indexes 
The purpose of inflation and other price indexes is to relate changes in the quantity 
of resources bought or sold to the amount of money spent on them (Allen, 1935, p. 58).  
Price indexes identify and isolate the effect of price changes. Removing the effect of price 
changes leaves information on quantity, or real, changes. Indexes permit us to answer 
questions like the following1: 
                                                
1 Conceptually, a price index measures the ratio of expenditures under two alternative price systems 
that provide quantities of goods and services of the same value.  
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 What has been the change in the real size of the economy over time? 
 What effect have changes in the DoD budget had on the resources taken 
from the economy and the resources available to the DoD? 
 How much real cost growth has there been in particular DoD procurement 
programs? 
Price indexes are meant to capture changes in the price of a particular level of 
capability. They should not capture price changes that are due to changes in the quality of 
products. As an example, the availability of much better computers at only slightly higher 
prices means society has gotten richer in real terms. Allowing price indexes to rise with price 
increases associated with quality improvements would make this appear not to be the case, 
so price indexes should not reflect the price of quality improvements. In other words, the 
portion of price changes that reflect quality improvements should be subtracted from price 
indexes. (We will later see that BEA and BLS indexes follow this procedure.) 
Price indexes can be developed for different classes of goods and services: the 
economy as a whole; all DoD spending; DoD procurement; specific types of DoD goods 
such as aircraft, ships, and computers; and the input prices facing firms that produce things 
for the DoD. Price indexes for different kinds of goods and services can vary substantially 
over time. Figure 1 shows how indexes for commercial goods and services have varied with 
the type of good and over time during the last 40 years. Some types of goods and services 
have moved along with the overall consumer price index (CPI). For example, the price of 
apparel has risen far more slowly, and the price of medical care has climbed at nearly 
double the overall rate since 1970. 
 
 Consumer Prices for Selected Classes of Major Expenditures 
(Administration of Barack Obama, n.d., Table B-60) 
The fact that one index has not fit all cases of commercial goods suggests that 
budgeting defense goods for the future should also distinguish between types of goods. In 
an International Monetary Fund paper, Premchand (1983) put it succinctly: “Every budget is 
formulated, either explicitly or implicitly, on a price basis. As prices rise and become 
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relatively unpredictable, the problems of budgeting are felt more keenly” (p. 242). Using 
different price indexes for different goods can help to ameliorate these problems. The BEA, 
which produces the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, notes that the use of a 
price index is appropriate if its definition and coverage closely match the category of product 
to which it is applied (BEA, 2009). 
Different organizations take different approaches in accounting for inflation in 
budgeting. Organizations such as the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) that are involved in financing aggregate government expenditure focus on broad 
issues, such as the balance between the public and private sectors, and particularly on the 
value to the private sector of resources taken for public purposes. These offices commonly 
analyze these issues using the GDP deflator, an index based on the price of the market 
basket of all goods and services provided to final users by the entire U.S. economy.2 By 
comparison, organizations such as the DoD Comptroller’s office that are responsible for the 
budgets of particular government agencies frequently use indexes that reflect the prices of 
the specific resources their agencies buy to support their activities (Premchand, 1983, pp. 
246–247). A possible compromise would use specific indexes to develop budgetary 
requirements and a broad index to reflect the constant-dollar burden implied for the 
economy as a whole. 
The Derivation of Inflation Indexes for Use by the DoD 
This section has three objectives: 
 to identify the regulatory and statutory provisions that authorize and prescribe 
the issuance and use of guidance related to inflation in the DoD; 
 to describe the flow of information for developing the economic assumptions, 
including those for inflation, used in generating the President’s Budget; and 
 to describe the five price indexes constructed by OMB and how they are used 
to develop the Comptroller’s appropriation-specific deflators. 
Regulatory and Statutory Basis 
The statutory requirement for all government budgeting is contained in Title 31 of the 
United States Code (U.S.C.), § 1104, entitled “Money and Finance.” This title directs the 
President to create an annual budget, delegating administrative authority to the OMB.3 The 
OMB requires every agency to prepare an annual budget for its spending that expresses the 
administration’s most recent policy objectives (31 U.S.C. § 1109).4  OMB forms these inputs 
into a total annual “policy” budget called the President’s Budget. 
The President’s Budget consists of spending for two types of programs: 
 discretionary programs, such as DoD procurement line items, which are 
funded at a level decided by Congress every year; and 
                                                
2 GDP is the sum of consumption, investment, government spending, and exports minus imports. 
3 31 U.S.C. § 1104 resulted from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Administrative responsibility 
initially existed within the Bureau of the Budget, with the OMB tasked through Executive Order in 
1970. 
4 The OMB also prepares a “baseline,” or “current services” budget, that assumes that current-year 
programs will extend into the budget year and out-years, and updates their costs using the most 
recent economic assumptions. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=411 - 
=
 mandatory programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, which are 
passed as permanent law by congressional authorization, written into the 
U.S.C, and funded by annual appropriation as directed by the permanent law. 
This paper concerns inflation for only the discretionary programs. The following 
paragraphs describe the general guidance contained in OMB Circulars A-11 and A-94 and 
the specific guidance to DoD Components in the Financial Management Regulation (FMR), 
issued by the OUSD(C), for meeting the OMB guidance. 
OMB Circular No. A-11 (2009) sets policy for how agencies are to treat inflation in 
their budget requests submitted for executive review. The relevant excerpt from Section 31 
(Paragraph 31.1(c)) of the circular provided below states that agencies must ensure that 
their inputs to the discretionary part of their budgets must be consistent with the OMB’s 
economic assumptions, including those relating to inflation. 
(c) What economic assumptions should I use when I develop estimates? 
All budget materials, including those for the outyear policy and baseline 
estimates, must be consistent with the economic assumptions provided by 
OMB. The specific guidance below applies to outyear policy estimates. 
OMB policy permits consideration of price changes for goods and 
services as a factor in developing estimates. However, this does not mean 
that you should automatically include an allowance for the full rate of 
anticipated inflation in your request. … 
For discretionary programs, you may include an allowance for the full 
rate of anticipated inflation, an allowance for less than the full rate, or even no 
allowance for inflation. In many cases, you must make trade-offs between 
budgeting increases for inflation versus other increases for programmatic 
purposes.5 
OMB Circular No. A-94 (1992) provides agencies with guidance for cost-benefit 
analyses. It recommends using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator for the overall 
inflation rate—the general increase in prices of goods and services—but permits using 
sector-specific indexes that differ from the general inflation rate “where there is a reasonable 
basis for estimating such changes.” Projects with a budget horizon longer than six years (the 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) years in the case of the DoD) are advised to use the 
final year’s rate in perpetuity. 
The Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 7000 14-R (DoD, n.d.) provides 
inconsistent guidance concerning price indexes in two paragraphs of Volume 2A, Chapter 1, 
Section 010303. Paragraph B.1 states that DoD budget estimates should “reflect the most 
likely or expected full costs.” Paragraph B.2, however, mandates that “price level changes 
will be based on data provided by OUSD (Comptroller),” and that the Comptroller’s 
appropriation-specific price indexes should be used to “determine the amount of price 
escalation for a procurement line item, major RDT&E system, or construction item over a 
given time period.” This guidance is being revised to make it clear that the most likely or 
expected full costs in then-year dollars should be used in budget preparation—even if this 
implies price increases different from those implied by Comptroller’s indexes—and that 
Comptroller indexes must be used to convert then-year dollar values to constant-dollar 
values. 
                                                
5 This section is titled “Compliance With Administration Policies and Other General Requirements” 
and is the only inflation guidance that appears in the 1,000-page document. 
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Paragraph B.2 seems to direct the use of the Comptroller’s indexes as the only 
acceptable value for calculating price escalation for specific programs, while the “most likely 
or expected full costs” of paragraph B.1 are presumably those for the specific items being 
purchased (DoD, n.d.). This appears inconsistent because the Comptroller’s indexes are not 
at all specific to the particular goods being purchased.  
Development of Economic Assumptions 
Each fall, senior officials and staff from the OMB, the Council of Economic Advisors, 
and the Department of the Treasury (collectively known as the “Troika”) draw on 
administration policies and use various forecasting models to produce a 10-year forecast of 
key economic indicators, including inflation. These economic assumptions update previous 
assumptions to reflect recent data. They are used in forming budget outlay and revenue 
estimates and developing the annual President’s Budget.  
The OMB provides the economic assumptions regarding inflation6 to the federal 
agencies each November as guidance. That guidance, and how the DoD Comptroller uses it 
to develop more detailed guidance for DoD Components, is discussed next. 
Derivation of Appropriation-Specific Price Indexes 
OMB guidance sent to the OUSD(C) covers the two prior years, the budget year, and 
four out-years for five categories of funding:  
 Military pay, using the projected Employment Cost Index (ECI) for wages and 
salaries published by the BLS, of the Department of Labor, adjusted for 
administration policy recommendations as prescribed in Title 37 U.S.C. 
Section 1009 
 Civilian pay, using the projected ECI less 0.5 percentage points, adjusted for 
administration policy recommendations, as prescribed in Title 5 U.S.C. 
Section 5303 
 Fuel, using the projected Energy Information Administration Refiner 
Acquisition Cost; this is the oil refiners’ average price for crude oil 
 Medical, using the projected BLS Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U) Medical price index 
 Other purchases—all purchases other than the four categories just listed—
using the projected values of BEA’s GDP price index as determined by the 
Troika and provided to the Comptroller by the OMB 
The OUSD(C) uses weighted averages of these five OMB indexes to construct the 
annual price indexes (often called deflators) for the DoD appropriation-level accounts shown 
in Table 1. The weights are based on how the spending for each account is distributed 
across the resources represented by the OMB indexes (military pay, civilian pay, etc.). 
                                                
6 The Administration’s economic assumptions include projections of consumer inflation measured by 
the urban Consumer Price Index, GDP (Current, Real, and the Price Index between them), 
Unemployment rate, 91-day Treasury Bill interest rate, and 10-year Treasury Bill interest rate. They 
are available in the OMB’s “Supplemental Materials” (see OMB, n.d.). 
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 Composition of Appropriation Level Inflation Deflators 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller [OUSD(C)], 2010) 
 
The OMB directs that, in deflating program spending for years beyond those for 
which indexes have been made available, program managers should extend the final year’s 
inflation rate into the later years (OMB, 1992, Section 7.b.). 
The table illustrates the process for the FY 2010 budget. For example, 30% of total 
DoD spending on operations and maintenance (O&M) was for civilian pay. The O&M index 
was therefore calculated as follows: 
O&M index = (CivPay index) x 0.30 + (Fuel index) x 0.05 
+ (Medical index) x 0.12 + (Other Purchases index) x 0.53 
It is significant that while the first four OMB indexes characterize specific types of 
resources (civilian pay, etc.), the last one, “other purchases,” does not. In fact, the OMB 
index for all other purchases is the GDP deflator, the single price index for all spending on 
U.S. goods and services. The GDP deflator is the main determinant of the amount of 
inflation allowed in the DoD budget. It is the sole determinant for procurement spending and 
is applied to fully 64% of total spending. (Weighting the “other purchases” percentages in 
the last column of Table 1 by the proportion of total outlays implied in the first column yields 
a weighted average of 64%.) 
The OUSD(C) deflators are issued to the DoD Components by guidance memo. The 
assistant secretary (financial management and comptroller) of each military department 
issues implementing guidance to its commands and components that is tailored to its 
department’s administrative procedures. The components use the deflators and instructions 
contained in the DoD FMR to re-price the President’s Budget through a resource 
management decision for submission to the OMB, and also to prepare detailed budget 
justification material for submission to the Congress. 
Current Practice for Incorporating Inflation Into Program Budgets and Cost Estimates 
for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
The DoD buys millions of different products: food for Service mess halls, spare parts, 
construction material, medical supplies, medical equipment, construction equipment, and 
many others. In these instances, the DoD buys at prices generally available in the market to 
large buyers. Price indexes for these kinds of commodities are properly based on their 
output prices. Such indexes might often approximate a broad-based index like the GDP 
deflator. 
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In this paper, we do not focus on these kinds of purchases. We are interested 
specifically in MDAPs because they are the focus of WSARA. Contracting procedures 
require that the prices of major defense systems be based on the costs of the inputs to the 
systems: labor and materials. This is even true of fixed-price types of contracts. Firm-fixed-
price contracts are based on the expected cost of inputs, while fixed-price with economic 
price adjustment contracts incorporate fluctuations in labor or material costs during the 
period of contract performance. It appears that the use of price indexes based on the 
relevant input prices is best for MDAPs. 
In this section, we provide an overview of the treatment of inflation by MDAPs and 
then turn to the practices of the individual Services.  
General Considerations in Use of Inflation Indexes by Program Managers 
Program budgeters have to think about inflation for two reasons: 
 In budgeting, they must estimate the future costs of their procurement 
programs in then-year dollars that are based on expected increases in prices. 
 They must calculate real cost increases of systems being acquired in 
constant (inflation-corrected) dollars, also termed real cost growth. Such 
calculations are used to identify systems that are suffering from high levels of 
real cost growth, a focus of WSARA. 
In addition, all parts of the DoD must use price indexes to translate budget 
submissions developed in then-year dollars to constant-dollar terms. 
Regarding budgeting, for a program to be fully funded, money must be appropriated 
up front to cover all projected future then-year costs of the portion of the program authorized 
in a given year, such as a specified annual production lot. If planners underestimate the 
extent to which the cost of the authorized program will rise over time, due to either 
unanticipated general inflation or increases in the prices of inputs specific to the program, 
appropriations will fall short and an overrun will occur—an undesirable outcome. We noted 
earlier that guidance regarding the treatment of inflation in budgeting appears inconsistent, 
calling for the use of OUSD(C) deflators and also mandating use of “most likely or expected 
full costs.” As we shall see, some DoD organizations rely on the Comptroller’s projections of 
inflation for developing then-year budget estimates, while others do not.  
Real cost growth is measured by the percentage increase in unit cost relative to a 
past baseline evaluated in baseline-year constant dollars. The baseline cost can be either 
the original program cost or a later estimate, depending on the program’s history. For 
procurement programs, the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the 1982 National Defense 
Authorization Act requires the DoD to identify for special attention those programs whose 
average unit cost growth has breached stated thresholds. 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) are used as the source of information 
concerning cost. The GDP deflator is always used to convert current-dollar costs to constant 
base-year dollars both for establishing the real cost baseline and for calculating real cost 
growth. 
We now turn to the specifics of how various DoD organizations incorporate inflation 
into their program budget estimates.  
Practices of Individual Organizations 
In this section, we briefly describe the procedures various DoD organizations use in 
incorporating inflation into program procurement budgets. Information in this section is 
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based on discussions with staff in the organizations cited. Because not all relevant 
organizations have been contacted, this is not a complete survey. 
Army 
The Army follows OSD budget guidance without exception in adjusting program 
costs and budgets for inflation.7 The indexes the Army uses are stored together with the 
standard Navy and Marine Corps indexes on the Navy Center for Cost Analysis’s (NCCA’s; 
n.d.) website tool for calculating inflation factors.  
Navy and Marine Corps 
NAVSEA Projections of Shipbuilding Cost. The Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) follows a systematic methodology to develop its own estimates of inflation for 
budgeting its ship programs. NAVSEA developed this methodology in response to a 2004 
direction from the Under Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition. 
NAVSEA has developed a complex and detailed model for making these estimates 
based on current and historical data on labor and material inputs. Labor prices reflect 
shipyard-specific labor and overhead rates based on shipbuilder forward pricing rate 
agreements (FPRAs).8 Material prices include class-specific material inflation and vendor 
base adjustments unique to each ship type’s market sector (nuclear, non-nuclear, 
commercial, etc.). Estimates of future prices are based on forecasts by Global Insight, a 
private firm that has been involved in economic and financial analysis and forecasting for 
many years. Historical indexes for labor cost increases are based on actual shipyard data, 
aggregated to the national level based on the workload at each shipyard. Historical material 
indexes are based on BLS producer price indexes. 
NAVSEA’s projections of shipbuilding cost increases are higher than the 
procurement cost forecasts issued by OUSD(C). NAVSEA estimated annual shipbuilding 
inflation at 3.3% during 2010–2015, while the OUSD(C) procurement index (the GDP 
deflator) increased at an average annual rate of only 1.5%.  
NAVAIR Pricing Models. The Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) develops its 
own projections for pricing naval aircraft (fixed- and rotary-wing). In a similar fashion to the 
NAVSEA model, NAVAIR develops estimates for labor and material cost increases and uses 
these to develop estimates for airframe, engine, and electronics, which are then combined 
into an overall estimate for fixed-wing aircraft flyway cost.  
The variance in these year-to-year projections is surprising. Note, for example, that 
aircraft inflation is forecast to be halved from 2015 to 2016.  
NAVAIR also makes detailed projections for helicopters and missiles. Future labor 
rates are based on projections for the labor contracts of the major aircraft and missile 
manufacturers, and materials prices are derived from estimates by Global Insight. 
Marine Corps. Marine Corps policy is to use the prescribed OUSD(C) inflation 
factors for program budget and cost estimates. No exceptions have been identified. 
Air Force 
Air Force policy for inflation adjustments is decentralized, unlike that of the Army and 
Navy. Program offices may develop their own inflation projections using industry-specific 
                                                
7 Discussion with personnel in the Army Cost Analysis Agency. 
8 An FPRA is a written agreement negotiated between a contractor and the government to use certain 
rates during a specified period for pricing future contracts or modifications. 
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prices. These estimates, however, are subject to review by program executive officers, 
Service acquisition executives, the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA), and the 
pertinent OSD offices. The description below is based on personal communication from the 
staff of AFCAA and other organizations. 
Air Force Aircraft. Most Air Force aircraft program offices estimate future program 
costs using specific inflation rates obtained by combining labor and material price rates, 
commercial forecasting model estimates, and contract information on FPRAs. The methods 
they use appear similar to those adopted by NAVAIR. 
Space Systems. Most programs use specific rates developed from historical data on 
inflation in space systems and comparisons with general inflation. 
Information Technology. Most programs appear to use OUSD(C)-promulgated 
rates. 
National Reconnaissance Office 
The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) purchases optical- and radar-imaging 
satellites for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. The NRO in 2004 compared its 
contractors’ labor and material prices with the standard inflation guidance for 1995–2001. 
Labor prices increased by 4.2% per year on average, but material prices showed no upward 
trend. Combining the labor and material prices with the appropriate weights yielded an 
average annual inflation rate of 3%. The OUSD(C) procurement deflator increased by 1.4% 
annually during the same period (Odom, 2004). The NRO bases its budget and cost 
estimates in large part on Global Insight direct labor and material price indexes.9  
Summary 
We have seen that some DoD organizations develop specialized inflation indexes for 
their programs and use them to ensure that their budget submissions “reflect most likely or 
expected full costs.” These indexes are used both for development of cost estimates for 
programs in then-year dollars and for budgeting. These rates can be substantially higher 
than those provided by the OMB. 
Real program cost and cost growth for MDAPs are then calculated using the GDP 
deflator to convert current dollars to constant dollars. 
We now turn to a comparison of the OUSD(C) price index—the GDP deflator—with 
other alternatives developed by BEA and BLS. Our interest here is in seeing whether using 
price indexes tailored to different defense goods such as aircraft and ships might offer DoD 
better tools for accounting for inflation. 
Analysis of Alternative Deflators for MDAPs 
Introduction 
Note by way of background that all DoD procurement outlays, including MDAPs, 
account for less than 1% of the GDP. There is no particular reason to believe that DoD 
procurement prices move in tandem with the other 99% of the economy. Moreover, using a 
                                                
9 We have not comprehensively surveyed the defense agencies or other organizations to establish 
their policies with respect to projecting inflation. Most such organizations do not have substantial 
procurement budgets. Those that do have substantial procurement budgets include the Special 
Operations Command, the Defense Communications Agency, and the National Security Agency, but 
we do not have information for them. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=417 - 
=
single price index for all MDAPs ignores the differences among the various military goods 
that are procured and the markets from which they are bought. 
We proceed by first comparing the distribution of DoD purchases with those in the 
economy as a whole and then comparing DoD inflation for various procurement categories 
with other inflation indexes of possible interest and with the GDP deflator. After that, we 
consider the issue of accurately forecasting inflation. 
The Distribution of Spending Across Economic Sectors 
Figures from Inforum show that the top 10 sectors that the DoD buys from are, with 
the exception of wholesale trade, all different from the top 10 sectors for the economy as a 
whole.10  The 10 sectors account for roughly half of all purchases in both categories, 
excluding direct purchases of labor. 
Because the DoD and the overall economy purchase very different mixes of items, 
using the GDP deflator to represent price changes for defense purchases is questionable. 
Alternative price indexes might provide a better representation. 
Retrospective Comparison of GDP With Alternative Price Indexes 
Bureau for Economic Analysis National Defense Deflators 
In addition to the GDP price deflator, the BEA publishes deflators for procurement of 
five major types of military systems: aircraft, missiles, ships, vehicles, and electronics. 
Figure 2 and Table 2 compare these defense deflators to the GDP deflator during the 1985–
2009 time period.11 
The defense deflators are “quality adjusted” to measure price changes, holding the 
physical specifications of the systems, or their “quality,” constant. Examples of quality 
adjustment for aircraft are features, such as engine improvements. The BEA measures the 
value of quality changes by their cost of production and excludes them from the price index 
by subtracting the average quality production cost from the average total production cost 
(Ziemer & Kelly, 1993; Foss, Manser, & Young, 1993). The BEA deflator is thus influenced 
by changes in average cost due to factors other than improved specifications, such as 
changes in input prices. According to the BEA, it may be difficult to estimate the quality 
change when an entirely new kind of aircraft, such as UAVs, is introduced, leading them to 
consider the entire price as quality change. 
                                                
10 The figures are from 360 sector databases developed by Inforum (The Interindustry Forecasting 
Project at the University of Maryland). The DoD figures are from the “Federal Defense” table and the 
economy-wide figures are from the “National” table. (“National” combines spending for federal 
defense, federal non-defense, non-federal government, and the private sector; Inforum, n.d.).  
11 These BEA deflators are expenditure-weighted averages of separate deflators for durables (largely 
spares, modifications, overhauls, and support equipment) and gross investment (new equipment). 
The data are from BEA National Income and Product Accounts Table 3.11.4, Price Indexes for 
National Defense Consumption and Gross Investment (BEA, 2013). 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=418 - 
=
 
 GDP vs. BEA National Defense Deflators 
 







Defense Ships 2.7% 90% 
GDP 2.4% 78% 
Defense Vehicles 1.9% 56% 
Defense Aircraft 0.1% 1% 
Defense Missiles -0.3% -8% 
Defense Electronics -1.5% -31% 
The BEA deflators in Figure 2 show wide variation: (a) substantial deflation over the 
period for electronics (which includes software), (b) virtually no change in the indexes for 
aircraft and missiles, and (c) substantial inflation for ships and vehicles. The large decline for 
electronics is due to the fact that computer speed, memory, and storage capacity have been 
rising faster than price for many years. The table and figure show that all of the BEA national 
defense deflators except for ships have had measurably to substantially less growth than 
the GDP deflator over the period. The wide variations, however, may be due to how the BEA 
identifies and measures quality adjustments. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Indexes 
Figure 3 and Table 3 compare the GDP price deflator with the producer price 
indexes (PPIs) that the BLS publishes for military and analogous commercial systems. Like 
the BEA deflators, BLS price indexes are quality adjusted. The algorithms are described 
differently but are mathematically equivalent, and they employ the same general criteria 
(holding specification constant). However, there is no communication between the two 
organizations on how DoD procurement data are handled. 
The bottom four PPIs in Figure 3 (solid lines other than for the GDP deflator) are 
relevant to defense, and the top three (dashed lines) are for analogous civilian goods 
included for comparison. The PPIs show substantially smaller growth rates for military 
aircraft engines and ships than for the analogous civilian goods. The disparity between the 
GDP and military growth rates is less for the PPIs than for the BEA national defense 
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deflators shown earlier. Aircraft engines have grown less, ships have grown about the same, 
and aerospace goods have grown more. (We are regarding the aerospace PPI as reflecting 
defense goods because BLS includes military communication and reconnaissance satellites 
as well as civilian-funded NASA space shuttles.) A now-discontinued PPI deflator for 
electronic computers during the 1991–2003 time period, normalized to 1991 = 100, indicates 
that computers experienced a huge average annual (quality adjusted) price decrease of 
14.8% during this period (Table 3). 
 
 Producer Price Index Defense and Analogous Civilian Deflators 
(BLS, n.d.) 
 
 Comparison of Bureau of Labor Statistics Defense-Related Deflators 
Deflator 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate Total Growth 
PPI Non-military ship construction 4.4% 182% 
PPI Civilian aircraft 3.6% 135% 
PPI Civilian aircraft engines 3.4% 121% 
PPI Aerospace product and parts 2.9% 101% 
PPI Military ship construction 2.5% 82% 
GDP 2.4% 78% 
PPI Military aircraft engines 1.4% 40% 
PPI Electronic computers (1991–2003) -14.8% -85% 
As with the BEA deflators, some of the differences in growth rates might be due to 
the criteria and numerical methods for making quality adjustments. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics Price Indexes 
That Are Most Relevant for Defense 
Figure 4 brings together the BEA and BLS PPI series that are most relevant to 
defense final products. There are major differences. The BEA indexes for defense aircraft, 
missiles, and electronics have grown much less than the GDP index. The aircraft index is 
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extremely far below the PPI index for civilian aircraft. The deflators for aerospace and 
military and ships are quite close to the GDP index.12 
 
 Defense and Producer Price Index Deflators Related to Defense 
Conclusions From Retrospective Comparison of Alternative Deflators 
The BEA national defense deflators seem most relevant to MDAPs because of the 
deflators’ focus on defense-related products, but they are not entirely credible. The indexes 
for aircraft and missiles show much lower rates of increase than the GDP deflator and even 
much lower rates of increase than is measured for the commercial aircraft sector. As 
mentioned earlier, this might depend in part on how costs associated with improvements in 
capability are measured for purposes of making quality adjustments. Other indexes—for 
example, the national defense deflators for ships and vehicles and the PPI for military 
ships—have moved similarly to the GDP deflator. 
The policy implication of these comparisons is that the difference in growth rates 
among the defense and defense-related indexes suggests that the DoD might obtain better 
measures of the real value of the overall MDAP budget by using sector-specific alternative 
price indexes instead of the GDP deflator. However, given the wide variability we have 
observed, our analysis fails to provide a clear picture. A better understanding of how the 
quality adjustments are made is needed. 
Perhaps most important, neither the BEA nor the BLS provides price indexes that are 
derived from the prices of inputs used in the production of various types of MDAPs. The 
development and use of such indexes by organizations like NAVAIR reflects the indexes’ 
superiority. 
                                                
12 The BLS does not publish indexes for military aircraft because there are not enough domestic 
producers to meet the BLS’s standards for survey respondent confidentiality and statistical accuracy 
of the index. 
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Prospective Analysis: Success in Forecasting Inflation 
Inflation predictions are useful in budget preparation only to the extent that they are 
accurate. The OMB forecasts the growth rates of the GDP deflator five years into the future, 
and Figure 5 shows the accuracy of these forecasts during the past 19 years. The initial 
forecast for 1991 in 1986, for example, was 2.3%, 1.5% lower than the most recent estimate 
of 3.8% in 2010.  
Overall, the five-year forecasts seem fairly accurate. The number of overestimates 
and underestimates was about the same (10 vs. 9), and the absolute value of the yearly 
errors averaged only 0.8%. The overestimates were a bit larger than the underestimates, 
with maxima of 1.7% and 1.5%, respectively. 
 
 Accuracy of Predictions of the GDP Inflation Rate Five Years in the Future 
(OUSD[C], 2010) 
The estimates usually became more accurate as the year of execution approached, 
but they varied a good deal from year to year.  
Because organizations like NAVAIR use inflation estimates developed by Global 
Insight, it would be useful to examine how accurate those estimates have been. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough information at present to conduct such an analysis. 
Assessment of Current Practices for Accounting for Inflation in the DoD 
We previously mentioned that price indexes are used for two separate purposes in 
the DoD: 
 budgeting for future spending, and 
 measuring real cost growth in acquisition programs and identifying those 
programs whose real cost has grown enough to justify special management 
attention. 
A key goal of budget development for particular programs is to allocate sufficient but 
not excessive funds for specific purposes. Budgeting for personnel, fuel, and health-related 
expenses draws on specific price indexes tailored for them and should meet the goal.  
In the case of MDAPs, as long as programs follow the guidance to “reflect most likely 
or expected full costs,” the goal should be met. However, if Comptroller rates are used to 
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estimate future price increases, in cases where those increases are expected to be greater 
or smaller than the Comptroller rates, programs will be underfunded or overfunded.  
Program offices may have a tendency to over-estimate future price increases in 
order to build contingency reserves. The rationale for using specific price indexes should be 
clearly presented in budget submissions and should be subject to systematic review and 
approval at both the Service and OSD levels. 
Our review of current practices in the section Current Practice for Incorporating 
Inflation Into Program Budgets and Cost Estimates for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
indicates that program- or sector-specific price indexes based on input prices are used in 
shipbuilding, aviation, and space—areas in which Comptroller rates are often deemed to 
rise too slowly. The section Analysis of Alternative Deflators for MDAPs indicates that price 
increases for ground vehicles may have not differed greatly from the GDP deflator. In other 
words, current practices for procurement budgeting may reflect most likely or expected full 
costs fairly well overall. 
Concerning the use of inflation escalation indexes for calculating real program cost 
growth, we discuss two possibilities: 
 Adjusting for changes in the prices of inputs used for the particular program. 
This would absolve programs of responsibility for a category of cost increases 
that are largely beyond their control.  
 Adjusting for price changes in the economy as a whole. This implies 
calculating real cost growth using the GDP deflator. 
Use of program-specific indexes would be most consistent with the goal of identifying 
programs whose costs have risen for reasons other than higher input prices. However, 
program-specific input price indexes are not always available, and there is some virtue in 
the simplicity of using a single index to calculate real cost growth. 
Using the GDP deflator to calculate real cost growth relative to the baseline can be 
justified. Real cost growth is consistently measured in terms of the cost of programs to the 
economy as a whole, not in terms of the physical resources used by the program. The 
current practice of using the best available information to prepare then-year dollar estimates 
means that program-specific input price increases that are expected to exceed general 
inflation are built into the baseline and do not count as cost growth. Unanticipated increases 
in input prices do contribute to measured cost growth and can contribute to Nunn-McCurdy 
breaches.  
Concluding Observations and Suggestions 
Observations 
 There is no single price or inflation index that should be used for all purposes. 
The appropriate index depends on the mix of goods and services under 
consideration. If the context is measuring cost to the economy, a broad-index, 
like the GDP deflator, is appropriate. If the context is narrower, like predicting 
the cost of specific kinds of purchases, a more focused index is appropriate. 
 The GDP deflator and the price indexes for particular sectors developed by 
the BEA and BLS are based on output prices. Although the DoD’s purchases, 
including MDAPs, are outputs from the private sector, the cost-based nature 
of contract development supports the use of input-price-based indexes for 
MDAPs. 
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 Current DoD practices regarding the treatment of inflation support the DoD’s 
needs for accurate budgeting and for calculating real program cost growth.  
 Although the use of program-specific estimates of future input-price changes 
is the best way to ensure accurate budgeting for MDAPs, the estimates 
require systematic review at both the Service and OSD levels to resist a 
possible tendency to accumulate budget reserves in the guise of preparing 
for inflation. 
 Guidance by the OUSD(C) on the use of its indexes to determine budgetary 
requirements and develop program cost estimates currently calls for budgets 
that (a) reflect most likely or full costs, and (b) use OUSD(C) indexes to 
determine price escalation. The guidance further states that the Comptroller’s 
price indexes should be used to “determine the amount of price escalation for 
a procurement line item, major RDT&E system, or construction item over a 
given time period” (DoD, n.d.). This guidance is being revised to make it clear 
that most likely or expected full costs in then-year dollars should be used in 
budget preparation—even if this implies price increases different from those 
implied by Comptroller’s indexes—and that Comptroller indexes must be 
used to convert then-year dollar values to constant-dollar values. 
 The use of the GDP deflator to measure price increases for all DoD 
procurement programs is conceptually inappropriate. Healthcare, fuel and 
personnel have price indexes specific to them. This is not true for 
procurement. Empirically, the GDP deflator may be a reasonable proxy for 
procurement inflation overall, though this cannot be demonstrated. But it does 
not allow the DoD to capture differences between, for example, ships, 
aircraft, and vehicles. Individual organizations often develop their own 
approaches. 
 This initial study does not indicate what alternative system- or category-
specific indexes would provide better estimates of inflation for procuring the 
various types of systems. Government statistical organizations do not publish 
price indexes based on the prices of inputs to the production of systems, but 
they presumably could. 
 Current practice does not appear consistent with either of the notions of 
constant prices noted at the start of the paper. By using tailored indexes for 
civilian personnel, military personnel, fuel, and medical care, it does not 
consistently calculate constant dollar costs in terms of resources foregone by 
the economy as a whole. By using the GDP deflator for procurement, it does 
not consistently calculate constant dollar costs in terms of the value of the 
resources acquired to the DoD. 
 Some procurement price indexes, particularly the BEA national defense 
indexes for aviation and missiles, appear surprisingly low, with negligible 
growth since 1985. This may be due, at least in part, to the way that quality 
adjustments are identified and estimated. 
 There has been little systematic tendency to either overestimate or 
underestimate inflation. Prediction of inflation five years in the future has 
been wrong by only about 0.8% on average. 
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Suggestions 
 Complete the planned revision of OUSD(C) guidance.  
 Investigate the feasibility of developing procurement price indexes tailored to 
different kinds of equipment. This would involve deeper analysis of the BEA 
and BLS for military systems, especially the use of indexes based on the 
prices of inputs to military systems.  
 Compare the accuracy of inflation predictions promulgated by OMB and 
those developed by Global Insight.  
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